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Corporate Governance and Inefficient Investment 




In this paper, we examine the investment decisions of family businesses at the firm level. 
Specially, by extracting the value of inefficient investments from a series of OLS regressions, we 
test the influence of family governance factors on inefficient firm investments. We find that 
inefficient investments are common among family firms, and that the number and extent of 
underinvestments are higher than that of overinvestments. We further discover that a large 
percentage of family members on the board and family member CEOs reduce both overinvestments 
and underinvestments, whereas the performance of founders on the board exaggerates both a 
business’ underinvestments and overinvestments. Finally, free cash flows tend to cause 
overinvestments, and reduce underinvestments. Our findings indicate that family-related 
governance factors influence a firm’s investment decisions, both in terms of overinvestment and 
underinvestment. 
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Family businesses play a significant role in the global economy. Family firms are located all 
over the world making up two thirds of the world’s total businesses; generating 70%-90% of global 
GDP and 50%-80% of jobs worldwide (Family Firm Institute, 2018). Family companies are the 
key drivers of economic growth and wealth creation in most countries and regions (Dello Sbarba 
& Marelli, 2018). In The U.S alone, there are 24.2 million family businesses employing 60% of the 
national workforce and contributing 63% of the national GDP (Astrachan & Shanker, 2003; Family 
Firm Institute, 2018). Canadian family firms create over 45% of GDP. Large family-run businesses 
in Canada achieve CAD $280 billion turnover accounting for at least 30% of the total amount of 
Canada’s top 100 companies (Bardsley, 2015). It is worth mentioning that there are more than 14 
million family firms providing over 60 million jobs in the private sector and making up a half of 
GDP in the European Union, and that three quarters of European family firms operate 
internationally (Gardner, 2016; Quico, Fernando & Hernández-Lara, 2014). In the Mainland of 
China, an estimated 24.3 million companies are family-owned; they account for 85.4% of firms in 
the private sector, offer 65% of jobs and contribute more than 65% to GDP (Sohu Finance, 2017). 
The economic statistics in most countries show that family firms are an undeniably a vital part of 
the global economy. 
What family businesses pursue is longevity rather than profit maximization, and investment 
is critical to this longevity of family firms (Chittoor & Das, 2007). Family businesses are often 
small and medium-sized enterprises, but there are also many international giants among them such 
as Wal-Mart, Volkswagen, Peugeot, Ford, DuPond, etc. These large family firms have survived the 
industrial revolutions, the World Wars, the Depressions, the economic and financial crises, the 
technological progresses and market competitions; and they usually have long histories of one or 
more centuries. People may wonder how family companies have achieved this long-term survival. 
Many researches who examine family businesses emphasize the importance of the survival of the 
firm (Chrisman, Cua & Litz, 2003), and discover that longevity seems to be the ultimate goal of 
family companies rather than profit maximization, since family members have inborn 
responsibility for the succession to their younger generations.   
Longevity is an additional intangible asset of a family firm that obviously strengthens the 
family and its business (Tàpies & Fernández Moya, 2002). It is an inherent goal of family firms for 
each generation to maintain their longevity and survival (Lumpkin et al., 2008; Lenders & Waarts, 
2003; Uhlaner, 2005). One study of 1,854 family firms revealed that family owners are more 
satisfied with family interaction, family identity and family mission than simple profit growth 
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(Mahto et al., 2010). Long-term survival can symbolize the credibility, trust and quality of a family 
firm, and brings benefits to external relations, improves the sense of honor of family members, and 
proves the family’s commitment to social responsibilities (Tàpies & Fernández Moya, 2012). 
Longevity can also benefit family firms in other ways, for example, firm history and origin are 
usually used as highlights of promotional advertisement, and consumers usually choose products 
or services in their daily life from the companies that have existed in the industries for longer years. 
This phenomenon reflects the vital importance of longevity for family businesses.  
Researchers have found that investment decisions greatly contribute to the longevity of family 
firms (Frankfurter, 1997; Hirigoyen & Ousseini, 2017). A lot of family firms begin with very small 
sizes at their starting stage; they could possibly become large companies only through continuous 
efficient investments. In market competition, large listed family firms also need efficient 
investments to sustain their longevities. Family firms give high priority to investing in assets and 
capabilities, such as the professionalization of management, equipment and/or real estate, R&D 
expenditure and training for sustaining their long-term survival (Chittoor & Das, 2007). However, 
it is obvious that investment decisions in family companies have received little attention, despite 
the fact that the issue of investment decisions is vital to family firms’ longevities, and family firms 
contribute a large portion of investments worldwide.  
Family firms might be more conservative or cautious in their investment behavior than their 
non-family counterparts. For the sake of longevity, family businesses may like to implement 
management strategies and tools to make their investment decisions reasonable. Moreover, family 
firms pursue long-term survival and usually have optimal investment policies, they are more 
rational in making investment decisions and more profitable than non-family firms in the long run 
(Stein, 1989). Contrarily, people may query whether investment efficiency of family firms is likely 
to be limited by their focus on long-term orientation (Lumpkin，G. T. et al., 2010). I also raise a 
query on investment efficiency of family firms, that’s one of my reasons for doing this research.  
Corporate governance possibly affects investment decisions and investment efficiency of 
family companies in many aspects, such as agent problem and information asymmetry. For example, 
incentive contracts and effective corporate governance may restrict overinvestment (Aggarwal & 
Samwick, 2006); however, the involvements of activist shareholders may decrease 
underinvestment by taking effective means of corporate governance (Richardson, 2006). Besides, 
family member shareholders have more information of their own companies than investors because 
of information asymmetry (Watts & Zimmerman, 1986), which may cause inefficient investments. 
Moreover, family member shareholders might have conflict of investment decision with non-family 
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member CEOs as family members pursue longevity instead of short-term profitability of their firms, 
contrary to this, most non-family member CEOs prefer short-term profitability for their personal 
interests. Generally speaking, corporate governance with family characteristics might be influential 
to investment behavior and investment efficiency in family firms. 
There is no doubt that the measurement and cause analysis of inefficient investment are hot 
topics of research in this field. At present, researches on measurement and cause analysis of 
inefficient investment are still at the stage of exploration. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988) 
examined the sensitivity of investment to cash flow using data on manufacturing firms, Richardson 
(2006) measured overinvestment and free cash flow using an accounting-based framework and 
examined whether corporate governance is influential in overinvestment of free cash flow. But the 
Richardson (2006) model may result in a bit of inaccuracy of overinvestment measurement and 
cause analysis, the methodology for measuring the extent of inefficient investment and analyzing 
impacts of family firms’ governance on inefficient investment needs further researches.  
The contribution of this thesis can be summarized as the following: We added some more 
accounting information to Richardson (2006) Expectation Model to better measure the residuals as 
the extents of firm level inefficient investment. In the process, this study is the first to estimate firm 
level inefficient investment using these additional accounting factors. In view of the fact that any 
one of measures of growth opportunities used in prior research cannot alone offer a complete 
picture of a firm’s actual growth, in Richardson (2006) Model is queried, we used Delta SALES 
and Delta Total Assets as actual growth factors instead of V/P as growth opportunity factor used 
in Richardson (2006) to measure growth for trying to provide a more complete picture. To examine 
whether family featured corporate governance factors is associated with overinvestment and 
underinvestment, we further tested with some variables capturing the characters of corporate 
government of family firms. We find evidence that there is a statistically significant relation 
between FCFt (free cash flow) and inefficient investment in diverse tests in my research, which 
shows that investment decisions are sensitive to free cash flow. We also run OLS regression models 
containing family featured factors: CEOt (whether the CEO of a firm is a family member on year 
t), BODt (the portion of family members on the board of directors on year t), Foundert (whether the 
founder of the firm is on the board of directors on year t), and CEO*Foundert and further discovered 
that the number of family members on the board and family CEOs reduces underinvestments, 
family members on the board reduces overinvestments in particular, whereas the performance of 
founders on the board exaggerates both family business’ underinvestments and overinvestments. 
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 highlights the literature 
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concerning the relationship among corporation governance, free cash flow and inefficient 
investment in family firms; Chapter 3 develops the hypotheses inferred from prior literature, 
Chapter 4 explores the methodologies measuring the extent of inefficient investments and 
examining the relationship among family corporation governance, free cash flow and inefficient 
investment, and describes the sample selection and data source used in this study; Chapter 5 
discusses the results of our tests that introduced in Chapter 4, including several robustness tests; 
finally, in Chapter 6 we draw our conclusions.  




2. Literature Review 
2.1 Definitions of family firms 
Regarding the definition of family firms, scholars make different judgments according to 
different criterion for definitions. Any definition of family firms needs to be interpreted by its social, 
economic, institutional and cultural context. The contents of different definitions of family firms 
include some or all of the following: percentage of family ownership, percentage of family 
members on board, family controlling interest, multi-generation, and family objectives.   
According to Alfred D. Chandler (1977), the biggest characteristic of a family firm is that the 
founder and his/her family members control the majority of shares, have a close contact with senior 
managers, and have the right in making decisions about the firm’s overall strategy, resource 
allocation and hiring senior managers. In Chandler’s definition, a firm can be recognized as a 
family firm as long as the family members keep the majority of shares and the right in decision 
making. The shortcoming about this definition is that it ignores in some situations, family members 
may take control of little portion of shares, but the family still keeps the right in decision making, 
in this situation, such firms still can be defined as family firms. 
  Chua, Chrisman and Sherma (1999) summarized 21 methods of defining family firms through 
analyzing massive literature about family business. In their findings, there are a lot of standards 
defining family firms among different scholars, some of them only ask for family members 
controlling shares or decision-making rights, while in other scholars’ opinion, both shareholding 
and decision-making rights are necessary for being a family firm.  
La Porta et al. (1999) standardized the portion of shareholding of the ultimate controller of 
listed companies, and sorted the ultimate controllers into following categories: family or person, 
government and social public sectors, financial institutions, joint stock companies, etc. They used 
20% of shareholding of family members as the threshold to define whether a certain listed company 
is family controlled. If the family holds more than 20% of a firm’s total shares, then it can be 
defined as “the listed family firm”. The structure of corporate governance and the way of operating 
of this firm will be influenced by family members’ control, comparing with non-family listed firms. 
In some other scholars’ point of view, the threshold of 20% shareholding is exaggerated and 
appears to be unnecessary in defining family firms. Andrei and Vishny (1986), Villalonga and Amit 
(2006), defined family firms as those where the founder and his/her family members, by either 
blood or marriage, continues in maintaining a minimum 5% equity stake in the firm. Anderson and 
Zhao (2010) carried on this definition in his research and added that it is not necessary for a family 
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member to be the firm’s CEO, but they will keep active roles in management or serving on the 
board of directors by gaining more information about their firms than other shareholders (Anderson 
& Reeb, 2004). 
Collectively, there are many different definitions of family firms, all the definitions can reach 
a common ground that family firms refer to the corporations whose ownership are partially or 
entirely owned and controlled by family members. Ownership can be used as the only standard for 
people to judge whether a firm is a family business or not, in this way a firm is named as a family 
firm only if its stocks are owned by family members.    
2.2 Inefficient investment: overinvestment and underinvestment 
In a perfect and complete (frictionless) capital market, firms are expected to efficiently invest 
in projects with positive net present values (Modigliani & Miller, 1958), while in reality it has been 
long recognized that firms make inefficient decisions, this can fall into two categories: 
overinvestments and underinvestments.  
An overinvestment problem is when management squanders its decision-making power by 
investing in unprofitable or overly risky projects that could damage the benefits of the shareholders 
and those of debtholders as well (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). When a firm holds a large amount of 
free cash flow, it may invest in negative NPV projects, with Tobin’s Q less than 1. (Lang & 
Lizenberger, 1989). If overinvestments exist in a firm, this means that the firm pursues high risk 
and high return investment at the cost of interests of shareholders and creditors. 
On the contrary, the underinvestment problems can be defined as the occasions when 
managers reject positive net present value projects, as a result, the firm’s value would decrease 
(Myers 1977). If a firm cannot achieve enough free cash flow, meanwhile, it might have a higher 
leverage which usually makes the firm face heavy financing restraints, the firm has to give up 
positive NPV projects. There is also another possibility that managers could reject some positive 
NPV projects, because these projects may need huge amounts of investment expenditure and have 
a longer payback period. Underinvestment leaves firm’s some recourses unused which surely is 
regarded as wastage to the firm.    
2.3 Corporate Governance and Inefficient investment 
The studies of inefficient investment have gone through many steps, and the causes of 
inefficient investments are mainly separated into the following three aspects: Information 
asymmetry, agency problem, and other problems about corporate governance. 
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2.3.1 Information asymmetry and inefficient investment 
Corporate governance stems from the problem of information asymmetry, when a firm’s 
insiders have more information than outsider stakeholders. The controlling shareholders can 
increase the degree of information asymmetry in order to protect their private interest (Richardson, 
2000). According to the findings of Guadalupe and Perez-Gonzalez (2006), agency costs can be 
reduced through improving information asymmetry, and producing a more accurate performance 
evaluation. 
Information asymmetry may lead to underinvestments. The mechanism of information 
asymmetry causing firm’s underinvestment that Myers and Majluf (1984) found in their research 
is: Because of the existence of information asymmetry, outsider investors in the capital market 
cannot get enough information of the firm’s investment project. To amend the potential risk caused 
by information asymmetry, outsider investors may request firms to provide high risk premiums.  
For firms which have used up their ability to issue low-risk debt, and have lower free cash flow 
than investment opportunities, may forgo these good investment chances rather than finance for 
them through issuing risky debts, eventually causing underinvestments. This will lead to the final 
phenomenon of adverse selection (Akerlof, 1970), that investment projects of good qualities will 
eventually be driven out of the market, leaving only the investment projects with poor qualities. 
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) found that the underinvestments led by the financing restrictions from 
external debt capital market makes a positive correlation between investment expenditure and free 
cash flow. Later on, other researchers have reached similar results in their studies on restrictions of 
financing. Fazzari et al. (1988) and Hoshi et al. (1991) also found that the investment behaviors in 
companies that have restricted by financing (have lower dividend payout) are more sensitive to free 
cash flow.  
Moreover, information asymmetry may also lead to overinvestments. The research paper of 
Meza and Webb (1987) discussed the relationship between asymmetric information and 
overinvestment; they found that the inability of banks in discovering the characteristics of 
companies’ projects will result in more investment than that of socially efficient level. Narayanan 
(1988) concluded that when external investors and internal managers have information asymmetry 
about the value of a certain investment project, firms may choose the project that has a negative 
NPV, thus lead to overinvestments.  
Furthermore, information asymmetry may cause underinvestment or overinvestment 
decisions to some typical managers. Kwak (2003), Anderson and Reeb (2003) suggested that 
because of the thorough knowledge about the companies’ operation and industrial information that 
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family members have, they will possess better inside information comparing with typical managers 
and outside investors. For this reason, typical managers may make under or over investment 
decisions when the information they have are not abundant. 
2.3.2 Agency theory and inefficient investment 
    Modern companies usually have a series of principal-agent relationships such as the 
relationship between the shareholders and the managers, the relationship between shareholders and 
loaners, and so on. These principal-agent relationships often have conflicts in interest between 
principals and agents, leading to overinvestment or underinvestment decisions.  
The principal-agent relationship between shareholders and managers may bring about 
inefficient investments. CEOs can receive private benefits through investment; therefore, some 
CEOs tend to overinvest in negative NPV projects (Jensen, 1993). In addition, managerial moral 
hazard of CEOs can also lead to overinvestments (Lambert 1986; Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992). 
Although some CEOs own stocks of the firms they work for, inefficient investments would still 
happen. In the research of Broussard, Buchenroth & Pilotte (2004), they came to the conclusion 
that investment increases along with the increase of management’s shareholding ratio, but when 
the ratio exceeds the defense effect of management, investment will then decrease as management’s 
shareholding ratio goes up. In contrast to agency problem causing overinvestments, investment 
performance is a direct indicator of a manager’s ability and competence, some managers care about 
their reputations more than gaining short-term benefits from aggressive investments. Under these 
conditions, some firms will experience underinvestments rather than their optimal investment plans 
(Campbell et al.,1989).  
The principal-agent relationship between shareholders and creditors may bring about 
inefficient investments too. According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), in the environment of 
modern market, shareholders carry limited liability to their companies’ operating risks. In this case, 
they tend to choose to invest in higher risk projects for higher returns. The returns will be shared 
among shareholders, rather than creditors, and once there happens to be a loss, all these losses will 
be shared among both shareholders and creditors, and thus managers are able to pass risks to 
creditors. Under this circumstance, creditors will increase the interest rate of debt to prevent 
potential losses, and this restriction may lead to underinvestments. 
With multiple principal-agent relationships, modern firms may face the complexity of 
inefficient investment problems. Myers’ (1977) research was the first to point out that in a high 
debt firm, the agency relationship between shareholders and bondholders can stimulate managers 
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to reject positive NPV projects. The reason is that managers act in shareholders’ interest, when 
facing risky debts, compared to realizing bondholders’ profit, shareholders are often not willing to 
finance for projects, and managers tend to choose not to invest in profitable projects, resulting in 
underinvestment problems, which therefore will hurt the firm’s value. In the paper of La Rocca et 
al. (2007), the authors summarized that both the agency problem between shareholders and 
debtholders, following the hypothesis that managers act in shareholder’s interest, and the agency 
conflict between new and old shareholders, assuming that managers act in the interests of the old 
shareholders, can lead to the problem of underinvestment, for the reason that managers are over 
conservative in choosing investment projects, thus it is possible that they reject profitable projects 
with positive net present values. 
 Principal-agent relationships commonly exist in family businesses, which inevitably lead to 
the problem of inefficiency investments. In the research of Kuo and Hung (2012), they classified 
agency problems of family firms into two types. Type I agency problem refers to the controlling 
family has a strong intensive to take control in management and thus reduce agency problems 
between shareholders and the management (Anderson & Reeb, 2003; Christman, Chua & Litz, 
2004). Type II agency problem refers to the conflict between majority and minority shareholders, 
for the reason that family control is always related to minority shareholder expropriation problems 
(Faccio, Lang & Young, 2001). Most family-controlled firms are able to monitor managers on a 
direct basis, leading to a less severe shareholder-manager agency problem, alleviating the potential 
overinvestment resulting from Type I agency problems. However, family firms may have more 
conflict between controlling family members and minority shareholders, because family members 
usually tend to use their convenient controlling position to extract private benefits through over 
investment, thereby aggravating Type II agency problems.  
2.4 Free Cash Flow, Corporate Governance and Inefficient Investment 
How to measure and control the impacts of corporate governance on inefficient investment 
has been the key point in the research of this area. Haberler (1931) found that the most important 
issue in corporate governance is not to maximize profit or market value, but to sustain the firm by 
maximizing the probability of long-term survival; an increase in this probability can be possibly 
achieved only through the investment decisions at the firm level. John and Nachman (1985) 
researched on the mechanism of dynamic agency relationship between corporate insiders and 
bondholders on underinvestments. They discovered that in the management of highly centralized 
firms, the interests of corporate insiders and bondholders are inconsistent, and managers represent 
the interest of the majority controlling shareholders. When managers make investment decisions 
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facing the inconsistent interests of the two groups, they tend to realize the interest maximization of 
the corporate insiders, rather than maximizing the interest of all stakeholders. So when an 
investment project requires external financing, the problem of underinvestment tends to occur even 
if the estimated NPV is positive, because the firm’s reputation is more valuable than the 
bondholder’s wealth for the insiders. The internal retained earnings can be used for building the 
firm’s reputation capital and thus winning a better access to external funds in the future.  
If firms have principle-agent relationships in their corporate governance structures, firms 
possibly generate free cash flow and further problem of overinvestment. Jensen (1986) proposed 
the Free Cash Flow Hypothesis in his published paper “Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate 
Finance, and Takeovers”, he made the statement that due to agency problems, information 
asymmetry between shareholders and managers broadly exists. Jensen then defined free cash flow 
as “firm’s cash flow in excess of that required to invest in all projects that have positive net present 
values when discounted at their relevant cost of capital”. The Free Cash Flow Hypothesis is 
originated from Agency Theory, that managers have incentives to drive their firms to grow beyond 
their optimal sizes, because managers’ compensations are positively related to the growth in sales 
(Murphy, 1985). Therefore, the managers tend to keep a relatively high volume of free cash flow 
and aggressively invest in some projects that have negative NPVs than allocating the cash to 
shareholders. Jensen’s main argument is that a firm’s financing restructuring will effectively reduce 
the problem of management abusing free cash flow. Jensen suggested that shareholders should 
grasp the main free cash flows and rationally employ leverage (debt financing) to reduce managers’ 
control, thus reducing the agency costs of free cash flow and bringing benefits to firms’ values. 
The research on measurement of free cash flow and inefficient investment is an important 
field in recent years. Richardson (2003) measured the extent of over investment of free cash flow 
and examined investing decisions in the presence of free cash flow. He analyzed the relationship 
between corporate governance structure and free cash flow using the data of the listed firms in the 
US from the year 1988 to 2002, the result of the research showed that in consistency with agency 
cost explanation, overinvestment is concentrated in the firms with highest free cash flow levels, 
and a good corporate governance structure, such as the presence of active shareholders, will 
efficiently mitigate potential over investment. Management in big companies with the independent 
director system is less likely to make over investments. 
Family firms have unique characters in corporate governance structures, and there are some 
insights about family firms’ investment decisions. Family owners have a major part of stocks of 
family business, and their personal wealth is mainly linked with family firm, which deeply 
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influences family firms’ investment decisions (Breton-Miller, Miller, & Lester, 2011; Czarnitzki & 
Kraft, 2009). Family firms are more sensitive to financial risks (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999), 
they prefer internal funds rather than external financing to prevent the potential loss of equity 
control (Myers & Majluf, 1984), therefore family firms usually have a lower dividend payout ratio 
(De Cesari, 2012 ; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003, Gugler, 2003). It is also found that non-family member 
CEOs are more likely to maintain a high-level free cash-flow rather than distributing cash to family 
member shareholders in order to invest in low or even negative NPV projects, which will cause 
overinvestments in family firms (Jensen 1986; Pawlina & Renneboog, 2005; Degryse & de Jong, 
2006).Some studies based on the classic agency theory argued that family companies do not 
encounter as many agency conflicts between owners and managers, and they are more willing 
invest in new projects to seek long-term survival (Czarnitzki & Kraft, 2009).  
2.5 Methodologies for analyzing inefficient investments 
A large finance and microeconomics literature have studied the relationship between 
inefficient investment behaviors and corporate governance. There are mainly three methodologies 
that contributed the most: FHP (1988) model, Vogt (1994) model, and Richardson (2006) model. 
2.5.1 FHP (1988) model 
Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) stated that in a perfect capital market, firms’ investment 
decisions are irrelevant to their financial structures. However, internal and external funds are not 
perfect substitutes, internal funds possess a cost advantage over external funds. Under this 
circumstance, firm’s investing and financing should be correlated.  
In their work, they linked conventional models (hereinafter FHP (1988) model) of investment 
to capital market imperfections for individual firms. Their studies divided a sample of firms to 
groups according to a priori measure of financing constrains, and then compared the investment-
cash flow sensitivities of different sample groups.  
The results of their studies showed more severe investment-cash flow sensitivity for firms that 
are more likely to face a larger gap between internal and external cost of funds, and that the firms 
are therefore indeed constrained. Their FHP (1988) model has been broadly applied to identify 
firms that are more affected by financing constraints, and finance institutions that are more likely 
to ease constraints. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) criticized the FHP (1988) model that 
higher investment-cash flow sensitivities cannot be interpreted as evidence that firms are more 
financially constrained, for they have found that there are less financially constrained firms that 
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appear to have significantly greater sensitivities than firms that are more financially constrained. 
2.5.2 Vogt (1994) model 
In Vogt’s (1994) article titled The Cash Flow/Investment Relationship: Evidence from U.S. 
Manufacturing Firms, he examined the reasons why cash flow is so important in the firm’s 
investment decision, whether it is because firms waste free cash flow to overinvest due to agent 
problem, or because the cost of external financing is too high due to the problem brought by 
asymmetric information. 
Vogt (1994) utilized equilibrium level of Tobin’s Q to differentiate the liquidity constrains 
arising either from asymmetric information or from managerial overinvestment of free cash flow. 
The results of Vogt’s research showed that both Free Cash Flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) and 
Pecking Order Hypothesis (Myers & Majluf, 1984) are potential explanations for the highly 
correlated relationship of investment decision and free cash flow. In large, for low-dividend firms, 
Free Cash Flow behavior is more likely to arise when they invest in tangible assets. Pecking order 
behavior is often seen in smaller, low-dividend firms when they invest in less tangible projects. 
However, in the article of Hadlock (1998), he criticized Vogt’s (1994) results on the grounds of 
inconsistency.  
2.5.3 Richardson (2006) model  
Richardson (2006) model can be used to measure the extent of overinvestment for firm level. 
Total investment expenditure is classified into two components: required maintain expenditure used 
to maintain assets in place, denoted by IMAINTENANCE, and investment expenditure on new projects, 
denoted by INEW. IMAINTENANCE is a necessary part of total investment expenditure for a firm to 
maintain equipment, plant and other assets. INEW consists of two parts: the expected investment 
expenditure in new positive NPV projects denoted by I*NEW and the abnormal investment denoted 
by IεNEW. I*NEW can be estimated from Richardson’s Expectation Model by using some control 
variables as growth opportunities, firm size, leverage, firm age, the level of cash, past stock returns 
and firm level investment in the last year and industry indicator, and IεNEW is the residual from 
Expectation Model as the estimate of inefficient investment. Richardson (2006) model is shown as 
following: 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + Σ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + Σ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜉  
If IεNEW>0, then IεNEW is the estimate of overinvestment; if IεNEW<0, then IεNEW is the estimate 
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of underinvestment. Richardson (2006) provided a method to measure the extent of inefficient 
investment, and he examined the extent of overinvestment in experimental study.  
2.6 Comments on literature review 
Until now, the definition for “family firm” is still not unified by academia as scholars define 
“family firm” according to different environmental situations and their own judgments. The 
judgments that authors make can usually be classified into three categories: the structure of 
ownership, the factors of the family, and the universality of the definition. 
The theory and practice study of inefficient investment have achieved many results, which 
mainly focus on distinguishing and measuring inefficient investments and mechanism explanations. 
The present literature has been discussing the causes of inefficient investments, mainly around the 
problems of agent theory, asymmetric information, and free cash flow. However, a comprehensive 
theoretical framework is not formed yet in regard of the studies of inefficient investment.           
There are mainly three models to analyze the problem of inefficient investment, each of them 
has been approved and applied by many other scholars, and their research results have greatly 
contributed to the literature of inefficient investment studies. However, none of them can be perfect 
measurement, each of them have both advantages and disadvantages. The measurement of 
inefficient investment still needs to be gradually improved. 
The current research of corporate governance and inefficient investment usually still remains 
at a general level. There are rarely research focusing on the potential characteristic reasons of 
family firms’ inefficient investing, and there are rarely research models specially designed for 
discovering the influential mechanism of the family firm’s special characters on their inefficient 
investment behaviors.  
Richardson (2006) focused on measurement of overinvestment of free cash flow and the 
impact of corporate governance on firm level overinvestment with data from a mixed sample of 
different firms. But the model was not used for the measurement of the extent of underinvestment 
in specific family firms. In Richardson’s (2006) model, BM, EP and Tobin’s Q  cannot give a 
complete picture of growth opportunities, so he used V/P as a measure of growth opportunities, 
however it still not a completive measure of growth. Moreover, there is still a possibility adding 
some more variables used as determinants of investment decisions or measures of growth 
opportunities or actual growth and financing constraints to improve the accuracy of the 
measurement of investment decisions of the expectation model.  
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 The above-mentioned research gaps need to be filled by future scholars, because family firms 
contribute a significant part to the economy around the world, but the current literature focusing 
on family firms’ inefficient investment is limited. These uncoordinated situations are the inspiration 





   In this sector, the hypothesis about the experiment of the investment efficiency performance of 
family firms will be introduced, and we will fully discuss the causes of inefficient investment in 
family firms. I certainly develop the hypotheses inferred from prior literature. 
3.1 Inefficient investment in family firms  
Firms are expected to invest efficiently in every project with positive net preset values in a 
perfect capital market. However, in the realistic world, there are always frictions in the capital 
markets (Modigliani & Miller, 1958; Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988), and many research 
results have proved that there are inefficient investments that are commonly seen in most of the 
firms around the world. 
Based on the previous discussed theoretical and empirical results, the first hypothesis that will 
be tested in this paper is: 
H1- Family firms are subject to inefficient investments (overinvestments and 
underinvestments). 
Family firms are sensitive to financial risks (Mishra & McConaughy, 1999). Longevity is an 
important intangible asset of a family firm (Tàpies & Fernández Moya, 2002). For most family 
firms, their ultimate goals are to always keep longevity in their firms, rather than to maximize their 
short-term profit. All family firms have an inherent goal for each generation, which is to maintain 
their longevity and survival (Lumpkin et al., 2008; Uhlaner, 2005). Researches find that family 
firms prefer internal funds rather than issuing new equity, when considering the prevention of the 
potential loss of equity control (Myers & Majluf, 1984). Family shareholders pursue long-term 
survival, which leads to family firms pursuing an optimal investment policy (Stein, 1989).  
Sometimes family firms may be over conservative in making financing and investing 
decisions, they will give up good chances of investing in positive NPV projects. From the research 
results of Kuo and Hung (2012), they stated that most family firms can monitor managers on a 
more direct basis, this will reduce the shareholder-manager agency problem, and thus will reduce 
the overinvestment problem in family firms. In a word, family firms are more rational towards 
investment in order to keep their longevity, resulting in a lesser likelihood to make inefficient 
investments. 
Based on the previous discussed theoretical and empirical results, the second and third 
hypotheses that will be tested in this paper are: 
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H2- Family firms make more underinvestments than overinvestments. 
3.2 Governance factors of inefficient investment in family firms  
According to Jensen’s (1968) Free Cash Flow Hypothesis, he stated that due to the Agency 
Problem and information asymmetry, the management is more likely to keep a relatively high 
volume of free cash flow and can possibly invest in some projects that have negative NPVs.  
The richness of a firm’s free cash flow will accelerate the conflict between shareholders and 
managers; therefore, it will add to the motivation of the management’s overinvestment. Moreover, 
compared with the firms having little free cash flow, rich free cash flow firms will have less 
financing stress, thus the underinvestment risk in rich free cash flow firms will be reduced. 
Based on the previous discussed theoretical and empirical results, the third hypothesis that 
will be tested in this paper is: 
H3- The amount of free cash flows and the extent of overinvestments in family businesses are 
positively related, and large free cash flows reduce the extent of underinvestments. 
According to much previous literature, CEO succession is a crucial factor to a firm’s success 
and continuity (Miller, 1993; Ocasio, 1999). Shareholders’ CEO choice between a family member 
and an external one is a critical issue for them (Burkart et al., 2003). Much literature has discussed 
the respective advantages and disadvantages of having family member CEOs and non-family 
member CEOs in family-controlled firms. 
Some studies in previous years had come to the conclusion that non-family member CEOs 
outperform family CEOs in gaining profits for the firms (Miller et al., 2014; Mehrotra et al., 2013; 
Bloom and Van Reenen, 2007). For the reason related to incentive alignment, some researches 
demonstrate the results that compared to family CEOs that or they need fewer compensation-based 
incentives to operate their firms well (McConaughy, 2000), for the reason that for most family 
firms, maximizing profit is not the primary task, family firm owners prefer to put ‘keeping their 
firms’ longevity’ above other considerations. Therefore, it can be inferred that most family CEOs 
tend to make less aggressive investment decisions than non-family member CEOs in family owned 
firms. Besides, family member CEOs will have more knowledge and experience about their firms 
learned from their previous generations, many of them will see and learn how to invest from their 
childhoods. Thus, in general, it is more likely that family member CEOs will make less inefficient 
investments, when compared with non-family member CEOs. 
Based on the previous discussed theoretical and empirical results, the fourth hypothesis that 
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will be tested in this paper is: 
H4- Family firms with family member CEOs reduce both underinvestments and 
overinvestments, when compared to firms with non-family member CEOs. 
The degree of family centralization may be another important influential element for family 
firms’ investment behavior. This centralization can be indicated by the percentage of family 
members on a firm’s Board of Directors. 
A family firms’ Board of Directors reinforces the governance of this family over the firm, the 
family can rely on the board for management, guidance and all kinds of decision-making. The more 
proportion of family members on the board, the stronger family interest will influence the firm’s 
decision-making results. As most family firms seek long term survival and steady profitability, 
most family firms with larger portion of family members directors tend to avoid aggressive or risky 
investment projects (Zattoni, Gnan & Huse, 2015). Similarly, like the story of family member 
CEOs, family members on board usually know and care for their firm better than non-family 
members, thus they will perform their best to reduce inefficient investments. 
Based on the previous discussed theoretical and empirical results, the fifth hypothesis that will 
be tested in this paper is: 
H5- Higher percentage of family members sitting on the Board of Directors reduces both 
underinvestments and overinvestments in family businesses. 
When the founder of a family firm is still a member on the board, such firms are usually more 
confident for their future prospective. On the one hand, founders who created their business worlds 
by their own hands, are usually full of experiences about both success and failure, and understand 
better about their firms’ features and the nature of the industries that their firms are in. On the other 
hand, people who launched their own career tend to invest aggressively to seek quick expansion, 
and thus possibly lead to overinvestments.  
Besides, for some large family business founders, they hope for a long lifetime of their own 
businesses, so they will tend to make conservative investment decisions, rather than aggressive 
ones (Cucculelli & Cucculelli, 2008; Molly et al., 2017) 
Based on the previous discussed theoretical and empirical results, the sixth hypothesis that 
will be tested in this paper is: 
H6- The preservation of founders on the Board of Directors increases both underinvestments 
overinvestments in family businesses. 
18 
 
4. Data and Methodology  
 4.1 Data and sample selection 
  4.1.1 Family firms sample 
 The name list of family firms in this study is initially obtained from the data sample 
provided by the works of Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) and Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012), 
which summarized the situation of family ownership of the top 2000 largest U.S firms based on 
total assets from Compustat from data-year 2001 to 2010. The sample excludes regulated public 
utilities (SIC codes 4812, 4813, and 4911 through 4991), financial firms (SIC codes 6020 through 
6799), firms outside the U.S, firms listed as master limited partnerships, and firms with share price 
less than $0.25. They differentiated each of the firms in each data-year by either family owned or 
non-family owned, following the definition of family firm by Shleifer & Vishny (1986), Villalonga 
& Amit (2006), that setting 5% ownership as the threshold, which is when the family owns (or 
votes) a 5% or larger stake in a particular data-year, then this firm will be deemed as a family firm 
in that data-year. 
 There is almost no research on inefficient investment concerning family firms; however, 
this study has a focus on whether any inefficient investment exists in the sample. To widen the 
spectrum of the sample, firms are selected from diversified economic sectors. The Global Industry 
Classification Standard (GICS) covering a total of 11 economic sectors is used to measure the 
spectrum of the sample; it was developed jointly by Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) 
and Standard & Poors in 1999. There are 260 family firms from 9 economic sectors in the sample, 
and Panel A of Table 1 shows the economic sector distributions of family firms.  
**Insert Panel A of Table 1 about here** 
4.1.2 Data selection 
We collected the accounting data of each firm in the selected company list provided by 
Anderson, Duru, and Reeb (2009) and Anderson, Reeb, and Zhao (2012); by data-year from 2004 
to 2010 from Compustat via Wrds. We further collected the individual personnel information data 
from BoradEx via Wrds, and complemented with the additional information of each firm’s family-
ownership change process obtained from the firm’s official websites, annual reports and the online 
encyclopaedia of Wikipedia, Bloomberg, news reports, etc. A big number of family firms have 
complicated histories of family-ownership changes and personnel changes, which may have been 
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ignored in previous researches. In this study, a lot of data about family firms is collected manually 
that guarantees a wider spectrum of family firms of different situations is included. In this way, the 
results from this study are more authentic and objective than that of the previous studies.  
The data of sample in this study is collected during the period from 2004 to 2010, there are 
1796 initial firm-year observations. It is found that 13 firm-year observations cannot be used, so 
the final sample in this study consists of 1783 observations, the remaining amount from initial firm-
year observations deducted by invalid observations, and Panel B of Table 1 shows firm-year 
observations in the sample in this study.   
**Insert Panel B of Table 1 about here** 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Firm level investment decisions model (Model I) 
In this process, this study is the first to examine firm level investment decisions with additional 
variables added to the Richardson (2006) Expectation Model. We mainly adopted the Richardson 
(2006) Expectation Model to estimate the expected investment for each of the firm-year 
observations in this sample. For more accurate measurements, we added some more variables to 
be determinants of investment decisions to the original model, including dividend payout, 
advertisement expense, operating return on assets, return on assets, short debt change, and 
tangibility.  
Richardson (2006) selected some accounting information as the variables in his Expectation 
Model based on the analysis about the relation between overinvestment and free cash flow for firm 
level. According to Song & Zhang (2019), many accounting information directly or indirectly 
affects the calculation of free cash flow, the measurement of free cash flow is determined 
comprehensively by much accounting information. Therefore, some extra accounting information 
may contribute to the accuracy of the measurement besides the variables utilized by Richardson 
(2006), if they are added to the Expectation Model (I).  
Prior research has already documented that the relation between dividend payout and free cash 
flow is evident in some samples of firms (De Cesari, 2012; Gugler & Yurtoglu, 2003, Gugler, 2003). 
Coincidentally, the investment expectation in our study is just derived from free cash flow; 
therefore, it is reasonable to add the variable of dividend payout to the expectation model.    
It is mentioned above that any variable used in the expectation model for firm level investment 
does not give a complete picture for the expectation of growth opportunities. So we tried to add 
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some other variables, such as Advertising expenses (AD), Operating return on assets (OROA), 
Return on assets (ROA), Short Debt Change and Tangibility to the expectation model for firm level 
investment, and I hope these variables are helpful to provide a more complete picture of growth 
opportunities for firms in sample.  
The variable representing growth opportunities in the Expectation Model, the advertising 
expenses (AD) can also increase investment confidence of the firm, there is a potential for firms to 
reduce financing constraints from external market through their advertisements. While 
advertisement causes selling expenses, cash flow from operations will be decreased, so investment 
decisions may vary with advertising expenses.  
   Operating return on assets (OROA) affects the amount of investment. The relations among 
OROA, growth opportunities and investments are examined by Freund, Prezas & Vasudevan 
(2003). They found that operating performance changes are negatively related to the amount of free 
cash flow and the buyer firms have a stronger relationship with fewer growth opportunities in 
announcement period, it is also found that buyer firms undergo a decline in both the return on assets 
and asset turnover ratios. So operating return on assets (OROA) is also selected to be an additional 
variable in my research.  
Similarly, Return on Assets (ROA), Short Debt Change and Tangibility are usually used as 
indicators of a firm’s profitability, debt paying ability, innovation capability and reputation relying 
on intangible assets. To some extent, these indicators can be used by investors to judge whether 
firms are worth investments, they are relative to firms’ growth opportunities or financing 
constraints, and furthermore, they would relate to firms’ investment expectation.  
The firm level investment decisions model used in my study is shown as following:  
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡−1
+ 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡−1
+ 𝛾2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1
+ Σ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + Σ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜉 
    Growth Opportunities (or Actual Growth) are represented by three different variables, which 
are V/P from the original Richardson (2006) Model, Delta SALES and Delta TA (total assets). The 
latter two variables are new substitutes of V/P. The variables in the bracket are the new independent 
variables added to the Richardson (2006) Model. The fitted value from the above regression is the 
estimate of the expected level of new investment, I*new,t, and then the residual is the estimate of 
inefficient investment, Iɛnew,t. The variables’ definitions are described in Table 2.   
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**Insert Panel A of Table 2 about there** 
In the original Richardson (2006) Expectation Model, the factor Growth Opportunities is 
represented by V/P, which is the substitute of Tobin’s Q, book-to-market of equity (BM), and 
earnings-price ratios (EP) that were widely used before his research. The reason Richardson (2006) 
used V/P is because the author thinks that V/P gave a more complete picture of the market’s 
expectation of growth opportunities. In this research, I employed two more factors to represent 
actual growth Delta SALES and Delta TA, for wider picture.  
In the test process, we firstly separately tested each of the three Growth Opportunity (Actual 
Growth) representative factors: V/P, Delta SALES, and Delta TA to see how they fitted the 
regression model. Moreover, we also used both the original Richardson (2006) Expectation Model 
and our modified model which had six more factors added to the original Richardson (2006) 
Expectation Model, to check whether the new factors are contributory to estimate efficient 
investments of each firm-year observation. This process is used to test hypothesis 1. 
To compare the overinvestment / underinvestment rate and the average overinvestment and 
underinvestment in family firms, we extracted the residual of each regression result, Iɛnew,t, which 
is the estimate of inefficient investment. We then compared the number of overinvestment / 
underinvestment over the total sample number, and calculated the average of overinvestment and 
underinvestment of family firms’ sample. This process is used to test hypothesis 2. 
4.2.2 Regression on family governance factors and inefficient investments (Model II) 
To test hypotheses 3 to 6, we propose a regression model to examine the influence of family 
governance factors on inefficient investments for firm level after obtaining the result of error term, 
Iɛnew, which is the inefficient investment of each firm level sample. When Iɛnew,t> 0, it means in that 
particular firm year, this firm had made overinvestment compared to the expected level of new 
investment, I*new,t, and vice versa. We separated the family firm sample group into two sub-groups, 
the overinvestment group and the underinvestment group, judging by whether Iɛnew,t of each sample 
is greater (goes to the overinvestment group) or less than (goes to the underinvestment group) 0. In 
the underinvestment group, we used the absolute value of Iɛnew,t for convince. For each group, we 
applied the following regression: 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝜀 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2Σ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜉 
   The family governance factors are CEOt (whether the CEO in a firm year is a family member), 
BODt (the percentage of family members on the board), Foundert (whether the founder is on the 
board), and CEO*Foundert (the value of CEOt times Foundert), respectively. The detailed definition 
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and resources are disclosed in Panel B of Table 2. 
**Insert Panel B of Table 2 about here** 
FCFt in this regression represents Free Cash Flow, which is the amount of cash flow beyond 
that necessary to maintain assets in place (including current debt obligation) and finance expected 
new investments (Richardson, 2006). Overinvestment is one of the main uses of free cash flow, 
whereas the behavior of firm’s underinvestment may also be significantly influenced by the volume 
of free cash flow. Regressions with FCFt explores the relationship between free cash flows and 
inefficient investments. This process is used to test hypothesis 3. 
Variables CEOt, BODt, Foundert, and CEO*Foundert are family corporate governance factors 
that may be influential to the decision of inefficient investments. Regressions (1) - (4) in Model II 
explore the relationship between overinvestment / underinvestment and these factors one by one, 
and regression (5) explored the relationship between overinvestment / underinvestment and all the 





5.1 Full Sample Summary Statistics 
Panel A of table 3 suggests descriptive statistics for the family firms’ sample.  
**Insert Table 3 Panel A about here** 
For each variable, Panel A of table 3 provides the mean, median, standard deviation, maximum 
value and minimum value.  
Panel A of Table 4 provides with the correlation matrix of all the variables in the family firm 
sample.  
**Insert Table 4 Panel A about here** 
Panel A Table 4 suggests that variables as DeltaTAt-1, DeltaSALESt-1, DividendPayoutt-1, 
ROAt-1 , OROAt-1, Inew,t-1, CashRatiot-1, and Sizet-1 have significant positive correlation with Inew,t 
(DividendPayoutt-1 at 10% significance level, others at 1% significance level), and Leveraget-1 has 
a negative correlation with Inew,t at 1% significance level. 
The correlation coefficients between most variables are less than 0.5, and all the variance 
inflation factors of each variable are less than 3, the risk of multicollinearity between variables is 
therefore excluded. 
5.2 Inefficient Investments in Family Firms (Model I) 
Table 5 reports the results for the tests of Model I of the family firms’ sample.  
**Insert Table 5 about here** 
More specifically, Model 1 reports the results of V/Pt-1 as the representation of Growth 
Opportunity with all the experimental factors newly added to the control variables in the 
Richardson 2006 Model. Model 3 and 5 reports the results of DeltaTAt-1 and DeltaSALESt-1 as 
actual Growth, respectively, with experimental factors and control variables. The results show that 
DeltaTAt-1 has a significant negative relationship with Inew, t-1 at 1% significance level, which means 
that the larger the family firm’s growth rate of total assets in year t-1 is, the less the family firm 
will make new investment in year t.  
As for the experimental variables in models 1, 3, and 5, OROAt-1 has a significant positive 
relationship with Inew, t-1 at 1% significance level in all the above-mentioned tree models. This is a 
side evidence for the findings of Freund, Prezas & Vasudevan (2003), that the larger the operating 
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return on asset of a family firm on year t-1 is, the more this firm is willing to make new investments 
in year t, thus may lead to a reduction of free cash flow in year t.  
Among the control variables in models 1, 3, and 5, Inew,t-1, CashRatiot-1, and Sizet-1 all have 
significant positive relationships with Inew, t. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Richardson (2006): The more a family firm invests in year t-1, the more likely that this firm will 
have the inertial to continue to invest more in the following year. And the more a family firm owns 
cash in year t-1, the more it is confident to make more investments in year t. Moreover, the larger 
a family firm is in year t-1, the more it is willing to expand its investments in year t.  
Models 2, 4, and 6 reports V/Pt-1, DeltaTAt-1 and DeltaSALESt-1 as representations of Growth 
Opportunity and Actual Growth, respectively, with only the variables from the Richardson 2006 
Model as control variables. Our findings about the performance of the three Growth Opportunity’s 
representations in the above mentioned three models are similar with those in models 1, 3, and 5: 
DeltaTAt-1 has a significant negative relationship with Inew, t-1 at 1% significance level, and the other 
Growth Opportunity factors are not significant, which means that DeltaTAt-1 can be a stable factor 
as Actual Growth to explain family firms’ new investments every year. 
In models 2, 4, and 6, Inew,t-1, CashRatiot-1, and Sizet-1 all have a significant positive 
relationships with Inew,t-1, which is consistent with our findings in models 1, 3, and 5 and the result 
from Richardson (2006). Moreover, unlike the results in models 1, 3, and 5, the performance of 
Leveraget-1 in Model 4 significantly influences Inew,t in a negative way. This result is understandable, 
because more investments means more risks a firm will undertake, family firms seek longevity as 
their first option instead of short-term profitability, therefore when a family firm has a large 
debit/equity ratio in year t-1, it is ore likely to invest less in the next year to avoid more financing 
risks. 
The global financial crisis in 2008-2009 had negative impacts on family firms’ investment 
decisions as well, for the year dummy variable for year 2009 is negatively related to Inew, t in model 
1 at a 1% significance level, and it is also negatively related to Inew, t in model 3 at a 10% significance 
level. This indicates that family firms were aware of the investment risk under the crisis, and 
adjusted their investment plans flexibly to avoid risks in the global financial crisis. 
Our Hypothesis 1 is defiantly accepted. Inefficient investments (overinvestments and 
underinvestments) are common among family firms, as in our regression results, there are always 
positive as well as negative residuals (Iɛnew,t ) in all of our models, which means that the fitted values 
of family firms’ new investments in our sample are always not equal to the real amount of their 
new investments every year. 
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Our Hypothesis 2 is accepted by the result as well. Take the model with the greatest adjusted 
R-square: Model 1, for example, the number of overinvestments is 778, accounting for 43.6% of 
the sample, and the number of underinvestments is 1005, accounting for 56.4% of the sample. The 
result from other models are similar. It is clear that more family firms prefer conservative 
investment plans, thus making less overinvestments than underinvestments. 
5.3 Family Factors affecting Family Firms’ Inefficient Investments (Model II) 
After gaining the test results from Model I, we extracted the residuals from the model with the 
greatest adjusted R-square: Model 3 to Model I, to continue our exploration of Model II: the family 
governance factors and free cash flow affecting family firms’ inefficient investments, to test 
hypotheses 3 to 6. 
We separated our family firms sample into two groups according to the residuals (Iɛnew,t ): The 
overinvestment group with positive residuals (Iɛnew,t ), and the underinvestment group with negative 
residuals (Iɛnew,t ). For the underinvestment group, we used the absolute values of Iɛnew,t for 
convenience. 
Panels B and C of table 3 suggest descriptive statistics for the samples in the above mentioned 
two groups.  
**Insert Table 3 Panels B and C about here** 
For each variable, Panels B and C of table 3 provide the mean, median, standard deviation, 
maximum value and minimum value of the two groups.  
Panels B and C of Table 4 provide with the correlation matrix of all the variables in the above 
mentioned two groups.  
**Insert Table 4 Panels B and C about here** 
Panel B and C of Table 4 suggest that FCFt have significant positive correlation with Iɛnew,t at 
1% significance level in both overinvestment group and underinvestment group, Foundert has 
significant positive correlation with Iɛnew,t at 10% significance level in the overinvestment group, 
BODt has a significant negative correlation with Iɛnew,t at 1% significance level in the 
overinvestment group, and BODt has a significant positive correlation with Iɛnew,t at 1% significance 
level in the overinvestment group. 
The correlation coefficients between most variables are less than 0.5, and all the variance 
inflation factors of each variable are less than 3 in both groups, the risk of multicollinearity between 
variables is therefore excluded. 
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Table 6 reports the results for the tests of Model II of the family firms’ sample.  
**Insert Table 6 about here** 
BODt is positively related with both overinvestments and underinvestments in family firms at 
1% significance level. The more proportion of family members on the board, the more intention of 
seeking long term survival and steady profitability the firm will have; thus, they will avoid risky 
investment projects and reduce the extent of underinvestments. Moreover, BODt reduces family 
firm’s extent of overinvestments as well. Family firms often have long-term plans and steady 
expansion goals; it is reasonable that when more family members are on the board, they tend to 
make efficient investment plans together. These findings fully support our hypothesis 5. 
Foundert is positively related with both family firms’ overinvestments and underinvestments. 
Founders are pioneers of the firms, they founded their own businesses, and some of them are more 
likely and courageous to expand their businesses into a higher level. Moreover, if the founder is 
still on the board of directors, this means that their firms are not ‘old age firms’, and may still be 
in the process of growing. Therefore, it is possible that family firms with founders on board will 
take in more aggressive investment projects, when compared with other family firms without 
founders on board. On the other hand, some of the founders may become conservative when their 
businesses grow to a certain extent, and as they are the founders themselves, there will be no 
investment experiences for their reference. Therefore, they may make underinvestment plans to let 
their firms develop smoothly. In general, the coefficient of Foundert in the overinvestments group 
is 146.6987, and the coefficient of Foundert in the underinvestments group is 74.2481, which is 
much smaller than 146.6987, this means that the founders’ effect on overinvestment is much larger 
than that on underinvestment. These results support our hypothesis 6. 
CEOt negatively influences both overinvestments and underinvestments, which is similar with 
the function of BODt. This result supports the theory that family member CEOs promote more 
efficient investments, when compared with non-family member CEOs. These results support our 
hypothesis 4. Besides, CEO*Foundert is positively related with family firms’ overinvestments at 
10% significance level. This result partially supports our explanation on why family firms with 
founders on board tend to overinvest more. It also conveys the message that to some extent, 
founders have more power over making investment decisions than CEOs. 
FCFt is positively related with both overinvestments and underinvestments at 1% significance 
level in all groups. This strongly supports our hypothesis 3. The richness of free cash flows always 
leads to situations of overinvestment, and eliminates underinvestment at the same time. This 




It is worth mentioning that Leveraget-1 has a significant impact on exaggerating a family firm’s 
degree of underinvestment, which means when family firms are having excessive debt in year t-1, 
it is likely to be cautious about its investment plans, thus end up making underinvestments in year 
t. On the contrary, ROAt will add to the potential of making overinvestments, it is understandable 
when a family firm is having high returns on assets, it probably will look for a greater prospect and 
end up with overinvestments. 
5.4 Robustness tests for Model II 
5.4.1 Endogeneity Concerns 
Table 7 reports the results for the Hausman Endogeneity Test for Model II - overinvestment 
group (Panel A) and underinvestment group (Panel B). 
**Insert Table 7 about here** 
We employed a two-stage instrumental variables approach to address the potential 
endogeneity between FCFt and Iεnew,t. We used CashRatiot-1, StockReturnst-1 and Year Indicator 
dummy variables as instruments for FCFt, we then used the predicted values of the potentially 
endogenous variable obtained from the first-stage regressions in the second-stage regressions. Our 
null hypothesis for Hausman Tests is that there is no endogeneity for all the dependent variables. 
The p-values for the tests in both overinvestment group (Panel A) and underinvestment group 
(Panel B) are all above 0.05, implying that we cannot reject the null hypothesis. 
5.4.2 Robustness Tests with different variables 
Table 8 reports the results for the Robustness Test with different variables OLS regression for 
the effect of family corporate governance factors on inefficient investment in two groups: 
overinvestment group (Panel A) and underinvestment group (Panel B). 
**Insert Table 8 about here** 
In this test, we replaced Leveraget with Tangibilityt, as well as OROAt with ROAt, to test the 
robustness of the Family Governance Factors and FCFt for all the five models to Model II. This 
result indicates that the impacts of CEOt, BODt, Foundert and FCFt on overinvestments and 
underinvestments in the robustness models are similar to those in Model II, which supports that the 
results of our Model II is robust. 
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5.4.3 Robustness Tests with different groupings 
Table 9 reports the results for the Robustness Test with different groupings OLS regression of 
the effect of family corporate governance factors on inefficient investment in two groups: 
overinvestment group (Panel A) and underinvestment group (Panel B). 
**Insert Table 9 about here** 
We sorted the two inefficient investment groups into 5 subgroups: High-Tech Firms, Low-
Tech Firms, Before Crisis Period (2004-2007), Crisis Period (2008-2010), and winsorized at 5% 
level, to test the robustness of the Family Governance Factors.  
The result shows that BODt is significantly negative in both panels, except for high-tech firms’ 
overinvestment subgroup. Foundert loses power in some of the subgroups, but in general it is always 
positive in all the subgroups, which is consistent with our findings in the original Model II.  
On the contrary, CEOt becomes positive in high-tech firms and crisis period, indicating that 
family member CEOs are not always the best choices for family high-tech firms or in chaotic 
periods. Generally speaking, the results from those tests are mostly similar to the original test for 






There are rarely previous researches focusing on the potential characteristic reasons of family 
firms’ inefficient investing, nor any models specially designed for discovering the influential 
mechanism of the family firm’s special characters on their inefficient investment behaviors. Our 
study is the first to examine firm level investment decisions with additional variables added to the 
Richardson (2006) Expectation Model. Besides, we extracted residuals (the value of inefficient 
investments) from the regression result of Model I, and separated them into overinvestment and 
underinvestment groups, and then tested the influence of family governance factors on inefficient 
investments for firm level.  
We found that the phenomenon of inefficient investments, both overinvestment and 
underinvestments, are common among family firms in the sample. The number and extent of 
underinvestments are higher than those of overinvestments. DeltaTA can be a good and stable 
representation for growth, and among the new factors introduced to the Richardson (2006) Model, 
operating return of assets significantly influences family firms’ new investments in a positive way. 
Inew,t-1, CashRatiot-1, and Sizet-1 all have a significant positive relationship with Inew, t, which is 
consistent with the findings of Richardson (2006).  
In the process of testing whether family governance factors influence family firms’ inefficient 
investments, we discovered that the percentage of family members on the board (BODt) of directors 
reduces both underinvestments and overinvestments, whereas having the founder on the board 
(Foundert) exaggerates the extent of both underinvestment and overinvestments. Family member 
CEOs (CEOt) negatively influences both overinvestments and underinvestments, which is similar 
with the function of BODt. As for the richness of free cash flow, it always leads to situations of 
overinvestment, and reduces underinvestment. We also conducted Hausman Endogeneity test and 
a variety of Robustness tests to validate our results. Our results are robust to potential endogeneity 
of the regressors in our empirical model, and continue to hold after changing different variables 
and dividing into typical groups. Our study has broad implications for academics, family firms’ 





Aggarwal, R. K., Samwick, A. A., 2006．Empire-builders and shirkers: Investment，firm 
performance, and managerial incentives．Journal of Corporate Finance, 12 (3), 489-515. 
Akerlof, G., 1970. The market for “Lemons”. Quarterly of Journal of Economics, 84, 88-500. 
Anderson, R. C., Reeb, D. M., Zhao, W., 2012. Family-controlled firms and informed trading: 
Evidence from short sales. The Journal of Finance, 67(1), 351-386. 
Anderson, R. C., Reeb, D. M., 2003. Founding-family ownership and firm performance: 
Evidence from the S&P 500, Journal of Finance, 58, 1301-1328. 
Anderson, R. C., Reeb, D. M., Zhao, W., 2010. Family-Controlled Firms and Informed Trading: 
Evidence from Short Sales. The Journal of Finance, 67(1), 351-385. 
Anderson, R. C., Ronald C., Reeb, D. M., 2004. Board composition: Balancing family influence 
in S&P 500 firms. Administrative Sciences Quarterly, 49, 209-237. 
Anderson, R. C., Duru, A., Reeb, D. M., 2009. Founders, heirs, and corporate opacity in the 
United States. Journal of Financial Economics, 92, 205–222. 
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R W., 1986. Large shareholders and corporate control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94, 461-488. 
Astrachan, J. H., Shanker, M. C., 2003. Family businesses’ contribution to the U.S. economy: A 
closer look. Family Business Review, 16(3), 211-219. 
Bardsley, D. O Canada! Family businesses flourishing in the True North (INFOGRAPHIC) 
http://www.campdenfb.com/article/o-canada-family-businesses-flourishing-true-north-
infographic, 30 June, 2015. 
Bloom, N. and Van Reenen, J., 2007. Measuring and explaining management practices across 
firms and countries. Quarterly Journal of Economics, 122, 1351–1408. 
Breton-Miller I. L., Miller, D., Lester, R. H., 2011. Stewardship or agency? A social 
embeddedness reconciliation of conduct and performance in public family businesses. 
Organization Science, 22, 704-721. 
Broussard, J., Buchenroth, S. A. and Pilotte, E. A., 2004. CEO incentives, cash flow, and 
investment. Financial Management, 33(2), 51-70. 
Burkart, M., Panunzi, F. and Shleifer, A., 2003. Family firms, Journal of Finance, 58, 2167–2202. 
Campbell, T., Chan, Y. and Marino, A., 1989. Incentive contracts for managers who discover and 




Cesari, A. D., 2012. Expropriation of minority shareholders and payout policy. British 
Accounting Review, 44, 207-220. 
Chandler, Alfred D., 1977. The visible hand: The managerial revolution in American business. 
Harvard University Press. 
Chrisman, J., Chua, J., Litz, R., 2003. A unified systems perspective of family firm performance: 
An extension and integration. Journal of Business Venturing, 18, 467-472. 
Chrisman, J., Chua, J., & Litz, R., 2004. Comparing the agency costs of family and non-family 
firms: Conceptual issues and exploratory evidence. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 
28, 335–354. 
Chua, J. H., Chrisman, J. J. and Sharma, P., 1999. Defining the family business by behavior.  
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 23(4): 19-39. 
Credit Suisse Research Institute, 2018. Family businesses outperform other companies. The CS 
Family 1000 in 2018.  
Cucculelli, M., Micucci, G., 2008. Family succession and firm performance: Evidence from 
Italian family firms. Journal of Corporate Finance, 14(1), February, 17-31. 
Czarnitzki, D., Kraft, K., 2009. Capital control, debt financing and innovative activity. Journal 
of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71(2), 0-383. 
Degryse, H., De Jong, A., 2006. Investment and internal finance: Asymmetric information or 
managerial discretion? International Journal of Industrial Organization, 24, 125–147. 
Dello Sbarba, A., Marelli, A., 2018. Family-controlled businesses and management control: the 
framing of “shareholder-oriented” practices. Journal of Management Control, 28(4):417-
456.  
Faccio, M., Lang, L. H. P. & Young, L., 2001. Dividends and expropriation. American Economic 
Review, 91, 54–78. 
Family Firm Institute. Global Data Points. 2018. https://my.ffi.org/page/globaldatapoints  
(accessed on 7 March 2019). 
Fazzari, M., Hubbard, G., & Petersen, C., 1988. Financing constraints on corporate investment. 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 19(1), 141–195. 
Feltham, G. A., Ohlson, J. A., 1995. Valuation and clean surplus accounting for operating and 
financial activities. Contemporary Accounting Research, 11(2), 689-731. 
Frankfurter, George M., 1997. Finance, investment and macroeconomics: The Neoclassical and 
32 
 
a post Keynesian solution. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 32 (2), 326-331. 
Freund, S., Prezas, A., Vasudevan, G., 2003. Operating performance and free cash flow of asset 
buyers. Financial Management, 32(winter):87-106. 
Gardner, A., 2016. Remarks at 3d annual European family business summit, Lisbon. 
https://useu.usmission.gov/remarks-3d-annual-european-family-business-summit-lisbon-
november-18-2016 
Guadalupe, M. & Perez-Gonzalez, F., 2006. The impact of product market competition on private 
benefits of control. Hitotsubashi University, Hi-Stat Discussion Paper Series No. 159. 
Gugler, K., 2003. Corporate governance, dividend payout policy and the interrelation between 
dividends, R&D and capital investment. Journal of Banking and Finance, 27, 1297-1321. 
Gugler, K., Yurtoglu, B.B., 2003.Corporate governance and dividend pay-out policy in Germany. 
European Economic Review, 47, 731-758. 
Haberler, G., 1931. Irving fisher's "theory of interest". The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 
45(3).  
Hadlock, C. J., 1998. Ownership, liquidity, and investment. Journal of Economics, 29(3), 487-
508. 
Hirigoyen, G., Ousseini, D. M., 2017. Investment decisions in unlisted family businesses. 
International Journal of Economics & Management Sciences, 6 (1). 
Hirshleifer, D., and Suh, Y., 1992. Risk, managerial effort and project choice. Journal of Financial 
Intermediation, 2 (9), 308–345.  
Hoshi, Takeo, Anil Kashyap and David Seharfstein., 1991. Corporate structure, liquidity and 
investment from Japanese industry groups. Quarterly Journal of Economics. 106, 33-60. 
Jensen, M. and Meckling, M., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and 
capital structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3, 305-360. 
Jensen, M. C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, Corporate Finance and Takeovers. American 
Economic Review, 76, 323-329. 
Jensen, M. C., 1993. The modern industrial revolution, exit, and failure of internal control 
systems. Journal of Finance, 48 (7), 831–880. 
John, Kose and Nachman, David C., 1985. Risky debt, investment incentives, and reputation in 
a sequential equilibrium. The Journal of Finance, 40(3), 863-878. 
Kaplan, S. N. and Zingales, L., 1997. Do investment-cash flow sensitivities provide useful 
measures of financing constraints? The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(1), 169-215. 
33 
 
Kuo, Y. and Hung, J., 2012. Family control and investment-cash flow sensitivity: Moderating 
effects of excess control rights and board independence. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review, 20(3), 253–266. 
Kwak, M., 2003. The advantages of family ownership. MIT Sloan Manage. Review, 44(2). 
La Porta, R., Florencio, L. D. S. and Andrei, S., 1999. Corporate ownership around the world. 
Journal of Finance, (2):471-516. 
Lambert, R. A., 1986. Executive effort and selection of risky projects. Rand Journal of 
Economics, 17 (Spring), 77–88. 
Lang, L., and Lizenberger, L., 1989. Dividend announcement: Cash flow signaling vs. free cash 
flow hypothesis. Journal of Financial Economics, (24), 181-191. 
Leenders, M. & Waarts, E., 2003. Competitiveness and evolution of family businesses: The role 
of family and business orientation. European Management Journal, 21(6), 686–697. 
Lumpkin, G. T., Martin, W. & Vaughn, M. (2008). Family orientation: Individual-level influences 
on family firm outcomes. Family Business Review, 21(2), 127–138. 
Lumpkin，G. T.，Brigham, K. H., Moss, T. W., 2010. Long term orientation: Implications for 
the Entrepreneurial orientation and performance of family businesses，Entrepreneurship 
and Regional Development，22 (3-4): 241-264. 
Mahto, R. V., Davis, P. S., Pearce, J. A. & Robinson, R. B., 2010. Satisfaction with firm 
performance in family businesses. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34, 985-1001. 
McConaughy, Daniel L., 2000. Family CEOs vs. nonfamily CEOs in the family-controlled firm: 
An examination of the level and sensitivity of pay to performance. Family Business Review, 
vol. XIII, no. 2, June, 121-132. 
Mehrotra, V., Morck, R., Jungwook, S. and Wiwattanakantang, Y., 2013. Adoptive expectations: 
Rising sons in Japanese family firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 108, 840–854.  
Meza, D. D. and Webb, D. C., 1987. Too Much Investment: A problem of asymmetric 
information. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 102, No. 2, 281-292. 
Miller, D., 1993. Some organizational consequences of CEO succession. Academy of 
Management Journal, 36, 644–659. 
Miller, D., Le Breton-Miller, I., Minichilli, A. et al, 2014. When do non-family CEOs outperform 
in family firms? Agency and behavioral agency perspectives. Journal of Management 
Studies, 51(4), 547-572. 
Mishra, C. S., McConaughy, D. L., 1999. Founding family control and capital structure: The risk 
34 
 
of loss of control and the aversion to debt. Entrepreneurship theory and practice, summer, 
53-64. 
Modigliani, F. and Miller, M. H., 1958. The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of 
investment. The American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3. 261-297. 
Molly. V., Laveren, E., Deloof, M., 2017. Family business succession and its impact on financial 
structure and performance. Family Business Review. 23(2), 131-147.  
Murphy, Kevin J., 1985. Corporate performance and managerial remuneration: An empirical 
analysis. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 7(1–3), 11-42. 
Myers S., 1977. Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5, 146-
175. 
Myers, S., Majluf, N., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics, 13,187-221. 
Narayanan M. P., 1988. Debt versus equity under asymmetric information. Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, 23(1), 39-51. 
Ocasio, W., 1999. Institutionalized action and corporate governance: The reliance on rules of 
CEO succession. Administrative Science Quarterly, 44, 384–416. 
Pawlina, G., Renneboog, L., 2005. Is investment-cash flow sensitivity caused by agency costs or 
asymmetric information? Evidence from the UK. European Financial Management, 11, 
483-513. 
Pimentel, D., Scholten, M. and Couto, J., 2018. Fast or slow? Decision-making styles in small 
family and nonfamily firms, Journal of Family Business Management, 8(2), 113-125.  
Quico, M., Fernando, C. P., Hernández-Lara A. B., 2014. Uncertainty in the family business 
facing the process of internationalization: Literature review and future research agenda. 
Intangible Capital, 10(4), 836-853. 
Richardson, S., 2006. Over investment of Free Cash Flow. Review of Accounting Studies, 11(2-
3), 159－189． 
Richardson, S., 2003. Corporate Governance and the over-investment of surplus cash. 
Dissertation, Michigan University.  
Richardson, V., 2000. Information asymmetry and earnings management: Some evidence. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 15, 325-347.  
Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. W., 1986. Larger shareholders and corporate control. Journal of 
Political Economy, 94, 461-488.  
35 
 
Sohu finance, 2017. Global family business survey 2016: How family businesses in the Mainland 
of China and Hong Kong move forward under the current situation. May 24, 2017. 
https://www.sohu.com/a/143238841_680864. 
Song W.，Zhang X., 2019. Internal control，free cash flow and cash dividend．Journal of 
Chongqing University of Technology (Social Science), 33 (3), 54-62. 
Stein, J., 1989. Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: A model of myopic corporate 
behavior. Quarterly Journal of Economics, November, 655-669. 
Stiglitz, J. and Weiss, A., 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect information. American 
Economic Review, 71, 393-410. 
Tàpies J, Fernández Moya M., 2012. Values and longevity in family business: Evidence from a 
cross-cultural analysis. Journal of Family Business Management, 2, 130-146. 
Uhlaner, L. M., 2005. The use of Guttman scale in development of a family orientation index for 
small-to-medium sized firms. Family Business Review, 18(1), 41–56. 
Villalonga B., Amit R., 2006. How do family ownership, control and management affect firm 
value? Journal of Financial Economics 80, 341–385. 
Vogt, Stephen C., 1994. The cash flow/investment relationship: Evidence from U.S. 
manufacturing firms. Financial Management, 23(2), Summer, 3-20. 
Watts R. L., Zimmerman J., 1986. Positive accounting theory. Prentice-Hall. Englewood Cliffs. 
Zattoni, A., Gnan, L., Huse, M., 2015. Does family involvement influence firm performance? 






Table 1: Sample and Data 
Panel A: Firms Classified by Economic Sectors 
GICS Codes Economic Sector Family firms 
10 Energy 12 
15 Materials 11 
20 Industrial 54 
25 Consumer discretionary 103 
30 Consumer staples 24 
35 Health care 14 
40 Financials 0 
45 Information technology 35 
50 Communication service 2 
55 Utilities 0 
60 Real estate 1 
∑  256 
Note: The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) is a standardized classification system for equities, developed jointly by 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) and Standard & Poors in 1999. 
Panel B: Observations by firm-years from 2001 to 2010. 
 Number of Observations Invalid Observations Valid Observations 
2004 257 3 254 
2005 256 3 253 
2006 258 3 255 
2007 258 3 255 
2008 256 0 256 
2009 255 0 255 
2010 256 1 255 
∑ 1796 13 1783 
Note: This table reports the observations for constructing sample. Besides Compustat via Wrds and BoradEx via 
Wrds, for the family firms, the individual personnel information obtained from the firm’s official websites, annual 





Table 2: Variable definitions and data sources 
This table presents a brief description of the variables used in my study and the sources/calculating methods that 
used to obtain each of the variables. 
Panel A: Variables for Model I 
Variable Description Source 
Inew,t Inew,t represents the new investment expenditure for every year, 
which is calculated as the difference between Itotal,t and 
Imaintenance,t. 
Inew,t=Itotal,t -Imaintenance,t. 
Itotal,t is the total investment expenditure. Itotal,t=XRDt (Research 
& development expenditure) 
+CAPXt (Capital Expenditure) +AQCt (Acquisition 
Expenditure)-SPPE (Cash Receipts from Sale of Property, Plant 
& Equipment). 
Imaintenance,t is the necessary investment expenditure to maintain 
assets in place. Imaintenance,t =DPt (Depreciation & Amortization). 
 
Compustat: 
XRD, CAPX, AQC, 
SPPE, DP. 
V/Pt-1 A measure of growth opportunities. Calculated as: 
V/P = Value of the firm (VAIP) / Market Value of Equity (MV); 
VAIP=(1-αr) BV+α(1-r) X-αrd, α=(ω/(1-r+ω)), where r=12% 
and ω=0.62. ω is the abnormal earnings persistence parameter 
from the Feltham and Ohlson (1995) * framework; BV is the 
book value of equity; d is the annual dividends; and X is the 







DeltaSALESt-1 A measure of growth opportunities. Calculated as: 




DeltaTAt-1 A measure of growth opportunities. Calculated as: 




LnAget The log of the number of years since the firm had been founded. 
 
Annual reports, firms’ 
official websites. 
CashRatiot-1 The balance of cash and short-term investments, deflated by 










Leveraget-1 The sum of book value of short-term and long-term debt, 
divided by the sum of the book value of total debt and total 











Year Indicator Dummy variables. It is a vector of indicator variables to capture 
annual fixed effects.  
Y2004=1 when the data is from the year 2004, Y2004=1 when the 
data is not from the year 2004; and so forth. 
 
Compustat: 
Data Year - Fiscal 
Industry 
Indicator 
Dummy variables. It is a vector of indicator variables to capture 
industry fixed effects. 
IGIC Sectors Code=1 when the firm is classified in a particular 
industry according to Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS), IGIC Sectors Code=0 when the firm is not classified in the 










The ratio of the total amount of dividends paid out to the 
shareholders relative to the net income of the company of the 




OROAt-1 Operating return on assets, a profitability ratio.  
Calculated as: 




Taxes and Interest; 
TA 
ROAt-1 Return on assets, a profitability ratio. Calculated as: 







The ratio of the amount of Short-term Debt Changed from the 
beginning to the end of the year over total asset. Calculated as: 
Compustat: 
DLTT = Long term 
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(Short-term Debtt -Short-term Debtt-1)/ATt debt; 
DBTE - Total debt; 
AT 
 
Tangibilityt-1 The ratio of tangible assets over total assets of the year. 
Calculated as: 
Tangibilityt=Tangible Assetst/Total Assetst 
Compustat: 
INTAN = Intangible 
Assets; 
AT 
* Feltham G A, Ohlson J A, 1995. Valuation and Clean Surplus Accounting for Operating and Financial Activities. Contemporary 
Accounting Research, 11(2):689-731. 
Panel B: Governance factors in Model II. 
Variable Description Source 
Iɛnew,t The residual from regression Model I. It is an estimate of the 
amount of inefficient investment. 
 
 
FCFt Free Cash Flow. The cash flow beyond that necessary to maintain 
assets in place (including current debt obligation) and finance 
expected new investments. Calucated as: 
FCFt=CFAIP,t - I*new,t ;  
CFAIP,t =Cash from Operationt - Maintenance Expendituret + 
R&Dt ;  
I*new,t  is the fitted value of Model I,  I*new,t = Inew,t - Iɛnew,t 
 
Compustat: 
OANCF = Cash from 
Operation; 
DP = Maintenance 
Expenditure; 
XRD 
CEOt A Dummy variable. CEOt=1 when the CEO of the firm is a 
family member in the current year, CEOt=0 when the CEO of the 
firm is a non-family member in the current year. 
To make sure whether an individual belongs to the family or not. 
BoardEx: 
Individual name & 
Individual role. 
Then, search this 






BODt The percentage of family members sitting on the board of 
directors at the current year. 
To make sure whether an individual belongs to the family or not. 
BoardEx: 
Individual name & 
Individual role. 
Then, search this 








Foundert A Dummy variable. Foundert=1 when the firm’s founder is still a 
member in the board of directors, Foundert=0 when the firm’s 
founder is no longer a member in the board of directors. 
 
BoardEx: 
Individual name & 
Individual role. 
Then, search this 




etc... To make sure 
whether the founder 
of the firm is still in 
the name list of 
BODt. 
 
CEO*Foundert A Dummy variable. CEO*Foundert=1 when the CEOt of the firm 
is a family member, and the firm’s founder is still a member in 






Table 3: Full Sample Summary Statistics 
Panel A: Family Firms Full Sample 
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
Inew,t 1,783 223.5686 19.7890 1,000.9540 -6,320.0000 17,527.0000 
V/Pt-1 1,783 0.4402 0.5014 6.8572 -285. 8872   18.6936 
DeltaTAt-1 1,783 0.0648 0.0430 0.2165 -0.7281 2.8604 
DeltaSalest-1 1,783 0.0722 0.0632 0.2274 -1.0000 3.1136 
Advertismentt-1 1,783 0.0160 0.0010 0.0333 0.0000 0.2861 
DividendPayoutt-1 1,783 0.0175 0.0036 0.0693 0.0000 2.1783 
OROAt-1 1,783 0.0886 0.0863 0.0867 -0.4128 0.5471 
ROAt-1 1,783 0.0356 0.0489 0.1066 -0.8256 0.6823 
ShortDebtChanget-1 1,783 0.0000 0.0000 0.0538 -0.8233 0.6325 
Tangibilityt-1 1,783 0.8066 0.8731 0.2065 0.1204 1.0000 
Inew,t-1 1,783 212.8367 20.3820 962.9861 -6,320.0000 17,527.0000 
LnAget 1,783 3.7204 3.7136 0.7441 1.7918 5.4116 
CashRatiot-1 1,783 0.1487 0.0874 0.1645 0.0000 0.9720 
Sizet-1 1,783 3.1122 3.0078 0.5909 1.6879 5.4837 
Leveraget-1 1,783 0.2947 0.2609 0.3105 0.0000 2.6512 
StockReturns t-1 1,783   0.2806 0.0797 2.9755 -0.9838 120.0071 
 
 
Panel B: Family Firms Overinvestment Group 
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
Iɛnew,t 778 272.8166 97.8100 766.0332 0.4300 10,359.0400 
CEOt 778 0.5925 1.0000 0.4917 0.0000 1.0000 
BODt 778 0.1797 0.1538 0.1073 0.0000 0.5000 
Foundert 778 0.4100 0.0000 0.4922 0.0000 1.0000 
Ceo*Foundert 778 0.2931 0.0000 0.4555 0.0000 1.0000 
FCFt 778 396.1383 108.8110 1,900.7500 -2,514.1100  22,012.7400 
Leveraget 778 0.3326 0.2954 0.3483 0.0000 2.6512 
LnAget 778 3.7974 3.8712 0.7965 1.7918 10.7630 





Panel C: Family Firms Underinvestment Group 
Variable N Mean Median Std.Dev. Min Max 
Iɛnew,t 1,005 211.1954 111.8800 438.2291 0.0800 7076.1400 
CEOt 1,005 0.5882 1.0000 0.4923 0.0000 1.0000 
BODt 1,005 0.1816 0.1429 0.1032 0.0000 0.5000 
Foundert 1,005 0.5652 1.0000 0.4959 0.0000 1.0000 
Ceo*Foundert 1,005 0.3970 0.0000 0.4895 0.0000 1.0000 
FCFt 1,005 54.7914 -26.0880 944.7558 -13,964.1400 15,472.1100 
Leveraget 1,005 0.2656 0.2112 0.2946 -0.5404 1.9351 
LnAget 1,005 3.6927 3.6376 0.9349 1.7918 19.9740 
ROAt 1,005 0.0476 0.0593 0.1026 -0.7802 0.6823 
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Table 4: Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
Panel A: Model I- Family Firms of full sample 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Inew,t (1) 1.000             
V/Pt-1 (2) 0.002 1.000            
DeltaTAt-1 (3) 0.105*** -0.002 1.000           
DeltaSalest-1 (4) 0.098*** -0.015 0.511*** 1.000          
Advertismentt-1 (5) 0.007 -0.016 0.000 -0.025 1.000         
DividendPayoutt-1 (6) 0.080*** -0.001 -0.059** -0.050** 0.007 1.000        
OROAt-1 (7) 0.137*** -0.017 0.259*** 0.235*** 0.044* 0.101*** 1.000       
ROAt-1t-1 (8) 0.127*** 0.029 0.409*** 0.262*** 0.055** 0.081*** 0.664*** 1.000      
ShortDebtChanget-1 (9) -0.001 -0.008 0.076*** 0.031 -0.008 0.002 -0.004 -0.037 1.000        
Tangibilityt-1 (10) -0.008 0.048** 0.032 0.036 -0.059** 0.025 -0.011 0.128*** -0.020 1.000       
Inew, t-1 (11) 0.741*** 0.005 0.195*** 0.123*** 0.005 0.068*** 0.133*** 0.118*** 0.008 -0.049** 1.000      
LnAge (12) -0.060** 0.038 -0.002 -0.135*** 0.047** -0.011 0.148*** 0.106*** -0.020 -0.030 -0.050** 1.000     
CashRatiot -1 (13) 0.094*** 0.001 -0.003 0.030 0.044* 0.035 -0.089*** 0.040* 0.003 0.297*** 0.058** -0.320*** 1.000    
Sizet-1 (14) 0.390*** -0.060** 0.130*** 0.050** 0.131*** 0.044* 0.157*** 0.123*** 0.023 -0.176*** 0.402*** 0.216*** -0.178*** 1.000   
Leveraget-1 (15) -0.051** -0.149*** -0.086*** -0.055** -0.043* 0.031 -0.169*** -0.349*** 0.081*** -0.282*** -0.045* 0.005 -0.347*** 0.253*** 1.000  









Panel B: Model II- Family Firms Overinvestment Group 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Iɛnew,t (1) 1.000         
CEOt (2) -0.047 1.000        
BODt (3) -0.129*** 0.487*** 1.000       
Foundert (4) 0.117*** 0.207*** 0.123*** 1.000      
Ceo*Foundert (5) 0.058 0.534*** 0.225*** 0.772*** 1.000     
FCFt (6) 0.506*** -0.098*** -0.098*** 0.050 -0.061* 1.000    
Leveraget (7) 0.021 0.039 0.081** -0.032 0.041 0.012 1.000   
LnAget (8) -0.035 -0.258*** -0.054 -0.570*** -0.517*** 0.017 -0.053 1.000  







Panel C: Model II- Family Firms Underinvestment Group 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Residualt (1) 1.000         
CEOt (2) -0.067** 1.000        
BODt (3) -0.114*** 0.402*** 1.000       
Foundert (4) 0.031 0.265*** 0.164*** 1.000      
Ceo*Foundert (5) -0.005 0.679*** 0.274*** 0.712*** 1.000     
FCFt (6) -0.214*** -0.059* -0.057*  0.023 -0.045 1.000    
Leveraget (7) 0.127***   -0.034 0.019   -0.129*** -0.067** -0.106*** 1.000   
Lnaget (8) 0.013   -0.253*** -0.099*** -0.512*** -0.417*** 0.034 0.006 1.000  
ROAt (9) -0.025 -0.038 0.020 -0.014 -0.049 0.138***   -0.321*** 0.042 1.000 




Table 5 The effect of growth opportunity or actual growth and other accounting on the investment expectation (Model I, full sample) 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝜆𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑜𝑟 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ)𝑡−1 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑑𝑡−1 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝛽3𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑂𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑡−1 + 𝛽5𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒𝑡−1
+ 𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝛾1𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡−1 + 𝛾2𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛾3𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑡−1 + 𝛾4𝐿𝑛𝐴𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛾5𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝛾6𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑡−1 + Σ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟
+ Σ 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑜𝑟 + 𝜉  
 
1−tPV  
 deltaTAt-1  deltaSALESt-1 
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No No  
Yes 
2009 negative* 
No  No No 
Industry Indicator No No  No No  No No 
         
Observations 1783 1783  1783 1783  1783 1783 
Adj. R2 0.5679 0.5675  0.5726 0.5714  0.5682 0.5677 
Note: The OLS regression results of family firms’ expected investments are presented for our whole sample over the period from January 2004 to December 2010. Our 
sample includes 1,783 firm-year observations from 256 family companies. Detailed descriptions of each variable are provided in Table 2. Summary statistics results are 
provided in Panel A of Table 3, and the correlation matrix between each variable is provided in Panel A of Table 4. For each regressor, we present both the coefficient 
estimate and p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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Table 6 The effect of family corporate governance on inefficient investment in family firms (Model II) 
Panel A Overinvestment group 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝜀 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2Σ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜉 
 











Family Governance Factors 
CEOt  -26.3621 
(0.5996) 
   15.75467 
(0.8197) 
BODt   -662.8694*** 
(0.0029) 
  -825.7112*** 
(0.0013) 

















































      
Observations 778 778 778 778 778 




Panel B Underinvestment group 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝜀 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2Σ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜉 











Family Governance Factors 
CEOt  -66.4896** 
(0.0188) 
   -35.4585 
(0.4121) 
BODt   -549.3419*** 
(<.0001) 
  -543.7884*** 
(0.0001) 

















































      
Observations 1005 1005 1005 1005 1005 
Adj. R2 0.0592 0.0706 0.0591 0.0540 0.0772 
Note: The OLS regression results of the effect of corporate governance factors on inefficient investment in family 
firms are presented in two groups: overinvestment group (Panel A) and underinvestment group (Panel B) over 
the period from January 2004 to December 2010. Detailed descriptions of each variable are provided in Table 2. 
Summary statistics results are provided in Panel B & C of Table 3, and the correlation matrixes between each 
variable is provided in Panel B & C of Table 4. For each regressor, we present both the coefficient estimate and 
p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively.
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Table 7 Hausman Endogeneity Test for ModelⅡ 
Panel A Overinvestment group 
Coefficients 
     (b)     (B)    (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
 iv ols Difference S.E. 
FCFt 0.23541 0.19538 0.0400 0.0491 
CEOt 11.5174 15.7547 -4.2373 5.1985 
BODt -754.5487 -825.7112 71.1626 87.3061 
Foundert 62.8526 103.3498 -40.4971 49.6841 
Ceo*Fdt 143.6073 102.6106 40.9967 50.2970 
Leveraget 101.5712 121.1270 -19.5558 23.9921 
LnAget 6.99804 8.76651 -1.7757 2.1785 
ROAt 529.1963 635.3219 -106.1256 130.2008 
          2=0.66 
            Prob>2=0.4150 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress 




Panel B Underinvestment group 
Coefficients 
     (b)     (B)    (b-B) sqrt(diag(V_b-V_B)) 
     iv     ols    Difference    S.E. 
FCFt -0.01648 -0.10228 0.0858 0.1347 
CEOt -38.2244 -35.4585 -2.7659 4.3417 
BODt -504.1769 -543.7885 39.6115 62.1774 
Foundert 78.2356 98.1164 -19.8808 31.2065 
Ceo*Fdt 19.6916 1.8382 17.8534 28.0242 
Leveraget 217.0224 200.5657 16.4567 25.8318 
LnAget 20.6225 24.6621 -4.0396 6.3409 
ROAt 121.2691 211.7391 -90.4700 142.009 
          2=0.41 
            Prob>2=0.5241 
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from ivregress 
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from regress 
Test:  Ho:  difference in coefficients not systematic 
Note: This table presents the results for the Hausman Endogeneity Test for Model II - overinvestment group 
(Panel A) and underinvestment group (Panel B). We employed a two-stage instrumental variables approach to 
address the potential endogeneity between FCFt and Iεnew,t. We used Casht-1, StockReturnst-1 and Year Indicator 
dummy variables as instruments for FCFt, we then used the predicted values of the potentially endogenous 
variable obtained from the first-stage regressions in the second-stage regressions. Our null hypothesis for 
Hausman Tests is that there is no endogeneity for all the dependent variables. The p-values for the tests in both 
overinvestment group (Panel A) and underinvestment group (Panel B) are all above 0.05, implying that we cannot 
reject the null hypothesis.
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Table 8 Robustness Test with different variables-The effect of family corporate government on ineffective 
investment in family firms (Model II) 
Panel A Overinvestment group 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝜀 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2Σ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜉 
 











Family Governance Factors 
CEOt -11.1069 
(0.8258) 
   38.0438 
(0.5868) 
BODt  -638.7294*** 
(0.0040) 
  -831.2948*** 
(0.0011) 

















































      
Observations 778 778 778 778 778 
Adj. R2 0.2645 0.2723 0.2695 0.2688 0.2784 
 
 Panel B Underinvestment group 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡
𝜀 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑎𝑚𝑖𝑙𝑦𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝐹𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑡 + 𝛽2Σ 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 + 𝜉 











Family Governance Factors 
CEOt  -62.5089** 
(0.0288) 
   -35.2331 
(0.4187) 
BODt   -499.2991*** 
(0.0002) 
  -483.40896*** 
(0.0007) 

















































      
Observations 1005 1005 1005 1005 1005 
Adj. R2 0.0548 0.0638 0.0541 0.0503 0.0682 
Note: The Robustness Test with different variables OLS regression results of the effect of corporate governance 
factors on inefficient investment in family firms are presented in two groups: overinvestment group (Panel A) 
and underinvestment group (Panel B) over the period from January 2004 to December 2010. We replaced 
Leveraget with Tangibilityt, and OROAt with ROAt, to test the robustness of the Family Governance Factors. For 
each regressor, we present both the coefficient estimate and p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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 Table 9 Robustness Test with different groupings -The effect of family corporate government on ineffective 
investment in family firms (Model II) 
Panel A Overinvestment group 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡


























Family Governance Factors 















































































      
Observations 43 735 394 384 778 
Adj. R2 0.2674 0.1456 0.1742 0.4257 0.4004 
Note: the parameter CEO*Foundert in model (1) has been set to 0, since it equals to CEOt. 
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 Panel B Underinvestment group 
𝐼𝑛𝑒𝑤,𝑡


























Family Governance Factors 

















































































      
Observations 196 809 623 382 1005 
Adj. R2 0.1025 0.3149 0.0581 0.0881 0.0403 
Note: The Robustness Test with different groupings OLS regression results of the effect of corporate governance 
factors on inefficient investment in family firms are presented in two groups: overinvestment group (Panel A) 
and underinvestment group (Panel B) over the period from January 2004 to December 2010. We sorted the two 
inefficient investment groups into 5 groups: High-Tech Firms, Low-Tech Firms, Before Crisis Period (2004-
2007), and Crisis Period (2008-2010), to test the robustness of the Family Governance Factors. For each regressor, 
we present both the coefficient estimate and p-value in parentheses. ***, **, and * denote statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10 % level, respectively. 
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